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INTRODUCTION
U.S. imports of Canadian wheat grew  as tariffs were lowered, follow-
ing the implementation of the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement (CUSTA) in 1989.
The subsequent implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) changed nothing-by the time it came into effect,  tariff barriers  on
wheat had been eliminated.  While trade flows waxed  and waned, any growth
in trade was accompanied  by an outbreak of tension between the two nations,
and threats of trade disputes.
A U.S.  International  Trade  Commission  (ITC) inquiry  was  initiated
formally in January 1994.  Following conflicting testimony from various sources,
the ITC forwarded three separate reports,  reflecting  a three-way  split decision,
to the  President on July  15,  1994.  Before the President took any action, how-
ever,  in a negotiated  settlement,  the government  of Canada agreed to limit its
wheat  exports  and  the U.S.  government  agreed  to cease  to pursue  the issue
under GATT.
The agreement lasted for  12 months ending in September  1995.  Sub-
sequently, tensions continued,  with threats from U.S. wheat interests whenever144  NAFTA - Report Card  on Agriculture
wheat  prices fell or the quantity of imports rose.  However,  since  1994  there
have been no further legal challenges.  Trade rules have remained virtually the
same, with minor changes in the use of end-use certificates.  Wheat trade, par-
ticularly  the  Canadian  Wheat Board  (CWB)  has remained  a concern of U.S.
producers,  but overall the trade agreements  appear to have resulted in a more
integrated  North American wheat industry.
This paper describes  the history  of the wheat trade and trade disputes
between  the United States and Canada during the past 10 years under CUSTA
and NAFTA.  The most significant dispute during this decade was the one that
led to  the1994 ITC  case.  We  discuss  the details  of that case,  and present in
summary  form  the different  elements  of testimony  brought before  the ITC,
including the USDA position, our own modeling results, and the ITC staff analy-
sis, as well  as the ultimate decision  and consequences.'  Then we discuss the
more recent events and summarize the overall experience and the effectiveness
of the dispute resolution processes.
CANADA-U.S.  WHEAT  TRADE  DISPUTES  UNDER  CUSTA
The Canada-U.S.  Free Trade Agreement  (CUSTA) came into effect in
1989.  Prior to the free trade  agreement,  explicit barriers  of importance  were
Canadian  import  licenses  on  wheat  (and wheat products)  and a  U.S.  tariff.
CUSTA scheduled the gradual elimination of all tariff barriers between Canada
and the  United States.  As a result of the CUSTA,  a formula was developed to
allow for removal of Canadian import licenses, and in return the United States
agreed to gradually phase out its tariff of $0.21  per bushel on wheat.  Notwith-
standing  its position  as a major exporter,  the United States  has imported  sig-
nificant  amounts of wheat  from  Canada,  especially  durum.  U.S.  imports  of
Canadian wheat rose from almost zero in the late-1970s, to over 2 million met-
ric tonnes  in  1993/94 (Figure  1).  Although  they represented  only about three
percent  of total  wheat  supplies  in the United  States,  the  shipments  of wheat
'For much of what is reported here, we draw heavily on our previous work,  including
Alston, Gray, and Sumner (1994,  1999), Alston, Carter, Gray, and Sumner (1997),  and
Sumner, Alston,  and Gray (1994).Aiston,  Gray and Sumner  145
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from Canada became a political irritant  in the United States, and legal disputes
began almost immediately  after the CUSTA was implemented.2
Beginning  in  1989,  durum wheat  producers  in North Dakota  argued
that Canadian  freight  subsidies  constituted  an export  subsidy,  in  violation of
CUSTA Article  701.2.3 After the United  States Trade  Representative  deter-
mined  that  Canada had  not violated  this  article,  because  the  freight  subsidy
under the Western Grains Transportation Act (WGTA) applied to all shipments
to Thunder  Bay,  whether  destined  for export or domestic  use,  the U.S.  Con-
gress  instructed the ITC in  1989 to examine  the  "conditions  of competition"
2There were previous restrictions on wheat trade under Section 22 of the U.S. Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1933 (as amended).  The U.S. Tariff Commission  (precursor to
the ITC) instituted a Section 22 investigation in 1939.  As a result, a U.S. wheat import
quota of 21,775  tonnes  was introduced.  In  1973  the Commission  and  USDA recom-
mended suspending  the quotas  indefinitely and, in 1974, the President did.
3Similarly,  the U.S. government has argued that the CWB has violated Article 701.3 of
CUSTA by selling below acquisition  cost (including storage, handling  and freight).
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between the U.S. and Canadian durum industries.4 The ITC rejected the  argu-
ment  that the CWB  had been  "dumping"  durum into  the United  States  (i.e.,
selling into the U.S.  below acquisition  price).
In  1992, the case of Canadian durum wheat sales was heard before the
binational panel,  under Chapter  18 of the CUSTA.  The binational panel made
its final ruling in January  1993, finding no compelling  evidence that the CWB
was selling below its  acquisition cost.  On reviewing the evidence,  Alston and
Carter  (1993)  suggested  that the primary  impetus  for increased Canadian  du-
rum exports  came from export subsidies,  under the U.S. Export Enhancement
Program  (EEP), creating  a premium market in the United States for Canadian
durum that had been increasingly exploited in the post-CUSTA period.5 More
recently, Alston, Carter, Gray and Sumner (1997)  developed a quantitative analy-
sis  of the  Canada-U.S.  durum  wheat trade  and  concluded  that the  increased
trade following the CUSTA had led to net costs to the United States as a whole,
and to U.S. durum producers.  They also pointed out that having eliminated the
WGTA  freight subsidies would have exacerbated  the effects on U.S. producers
by increasing  CWB incentives to ship wheat South.
While these studies identified  a major source of the increased trade as
being  U.S. policy rather than either Canadian policy or dumping by the CWB,
they also  supported the U.S.  wheat  growers'  contention  that freer  trade with
Canada was  not  in  their  interests,  especially  in  the context  of a  U.S.  export
subsidy scheme.  In response to relentless pressure from U.S. wheat-producing
interests,  combined  with some  other factors,  a  second ITC  investigation  was
initiated in January  1994.
4This was USITC Investigation No. 332-285  "Durum Wheat: Conditions of Competi-
tion Between the U.S. and Canadian Industries."  The investigation  began on December
4,  1989.  The final report was released in June  1990.
5 EEP was established in  1985 and designed to boost the volume of U.S. exports.  It has
played an important role in U.S. wheat exports.  Gardner (1995) documents total wheat
EEP expenditure during  1985-93  of $4.9 billion,  with  subsidies averaging  about $31
per metric tonne or about 25  percent of the gross price.
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THE  1994 "SECTION  22" DISPUTE
The  1994 ITC inquiry focused on the impacts of U.S. imports of Cana-
dian  wheat on  the U.S.  wheat farm program,  in relation  to Section  22 of the
U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933  (as amended).  To apply section 22,
the U.S. government  had to show that imports  had (or threatened to)  "materi-
ally interfered" with the operation of the U.S. farm program for wheat.  Parties
agreed that the only  reasonable  channel for such interference  was by causing
lower U.S. wheat prices; the dispute turned on how much lower.
A finding of "material interference"  by the ITC could have led them to
recommend  that the  President  implement  tariffs  or quantitative  restrictions
against  Canadian wheat.  In its evidence  before  the ITC,  the USDA claimed
such material interference,  and recommended a tariff rate quota be introduced.
In contrast,  submissions on behalf of U.S. pasta makers, flour millers and grain
handling industry, and Canadian grain industry interests led by the CWB, found
much smaller effects-on  the order of one-tenth of the effects claimed  by the
USDA.  Critical differences in approaches in these studies concerned the treat-
ment of trade with third countries,  the role of trade in pasta products,  and as-
sumptions  about elasticities.
The  USDA Position
In testimony before  the ITC,  the USDA claimed  effects of Canadian
imports on the U.S. wheat farm program that, if valid, would seem to justify an
intervention under Section 22.  In testimony before the ITC on April 28,  1994,
Keith Collins, Acting Assistant  Secretary  for Economics,  U.S.  Department  of
Agriculture,  concluded  as follows:
After a review of all the facts and all of the evidence, we
believe the case for material  interference is conclusive ...
Imports materially interfere by increasing  program costs
through higher deficiency payments and loan activity...  For
1994-95, imports are  expected to increase the cost of  the USDA
wheat program  by an estimated $228 million, 15% of the pro-
jected cost of the entire wheat program.  (p.  11)
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The USDA  did not  present details of the model  and assumptions  un-
derlying  their  quantitative estimates.  From  the testimony we can  infer  some
implicit assumptions  (for instance,  that the USDA ignored some third-country
effects and pasta trade, and aggregated all wheat into a single category),  and we
can  even deduce  some implied values for elasticities,  but the complete infor-
mation  that would  be  required  to  replicate  the  figures  in a  formal  modeling
context is not available.  Below, we first summarize our own model and results
under the most reasonable parameter values  and explicit market  assumptions,
and then we show the effects of imposing  alternative (less reasonable) assump-
tions, that would appear to be consistent with the USDA testimony.
A Simulation Model  of U.S./Canada  Wheat  Trade  and  Policy
We  developed  a  three-region  model  of wheat  production,  consump-
tion,  policy  and  trade.  In  our model,  wheats  of different  classes,  types  and
characteristics  are  segregated  according  to  their end-use  characteristics,  into
three categories: durum, other  milling, and feed.  The three regions are Canada,
the  United States,  and an aggregate  representing  the rest of the world (ROW).
Each of the three regions produces each type of wheat, with feed wheat being a
byproduct  of milling and durum  wheat production,  and consumes  some of its
own production  of each  type.  Canada exports all three  types of wheat to the
ROW and  to the  United States;  the  United States  exports milling and  durum
(but not feed) wheat to  the ROW; and the ROW exports durum, in the form of
pasta, to the  United States.
The complete details of the model,  its structure, data sources, the rep-
resentation of policy  in the United States and Canada, and the values  used for
the parameters,  can be found in Alston,  Gray, and Sumner (1994)  and Sumner,
Alston, and Gray (1994).  The supply and demand equations  are represented  by
functions  that are  linear in prices and quantities over the range of changes be-
ing  analyzed.  Supply is  linked among  categories  within a region, but there is
no appreciable  substitution in consumption among  these three categories.  The
slopes  and  intercepts  of the  supply  and demand  equations  are  defined  using
initial quantities and prices, and the own- and cross-price  elasticities of supply
and demand.
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On the demand side, wheats of the same  type from different  regions
are treated as differentiated products  in an Armington framework  in which the
own- and cross-price elasticities of demand for any type of wheat (durum, mill-
ing or feed) in  any region  depend on market shares  (which  can be calculated
using data on trade flows), the overall elasticity of demand for the commodity,
and elasticities of substitution among different sources.  We obtained estimates
of these underlying  elasticities from a combination of a review of the relevant
literature  and  informed  professional judgment,  as discussed  in Alston,  Gray,
and Sumner (1994,  1999).  On the supply side, durum and other wheat compete
for the same land and other specialized inputs.  Therefore, the cross-price  elas-
ticities relate to the effect of the change in the price of durum in a region on the
same region's production  of other wheat,  and vice versa.
Simulations
In  Sumner, Alston,  and Gray (1994)  we presented  simulations for two
crop  years,  1993/94  and  1994/95.  We reported detailed  sensitivity  analysis
showing a range of results for a range of parameter values.  In what follows we
use base or preferred values  for all parameters  unless  otherwise  stated and, to
conserve  space, we report simulation results only for 1993/94.6  The most im-
portant result for present policy purposes is the calculated effect on the average
price for U.S. wheat and, therefore, the effect on the total expenditure under the
U.S. wheat program.
First, the model was run to simulate the quantities and prices for 1993/
94 to define the base situation, as  shown in column A of Table  1. Second,  we
simulated the effects of reducing Canadian  exports to the United States of all
types of wheat to half the base-run values in  1993/94.  The simulation results
are given in column B of Table 1. Relative to the base simulation in column A,
the  reduction  in  imports  would  have led to  a  saving  in  costs  of U.S.  wheat
deficiency payments of $9.9 million in  1993/94.
61993/94  was an  unusual year in terms of weather damage to wheat which  affected
both the availability of high quality durum and milling wheat in the United States (in-
creasing demand for imports from Canada) and the supply of feed wheat to the United
States from Canada (a higher proportion of Canadian production was downgraded).
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Table 1:  Effects of Imports on U.S. Wheat  Price and Program  Costs,
1993/94.
A  B  C  D
Quantity, Price or Value  Base  Imports at  Imports at  Combined
50%  of  22.40%  of  Assumptions
Base  Base
U.S.  Imports  ('000 tons)
Feed Wheat  1,088.61  544.31  243.85  243.85
Milling Wheat  680.38  340.19  152.41  152.41
Durum  Wheat  653.17  326.58  146.31  146.31
Durum  Pasta  163.29  216.18  244.99  322.36
U.S.  Production  ('000 tons)
Feed Wheat  7,075.99  7,084.07  7,088.79  7,150.59
Milling Wheat  56,417.37  56,445.38  56,461.46  56,784.22
Durum  Wheat  1,877.86  1,916.50  1,939.25  2,125.65U.S.
Exports  ('000 tons)
Feed  Wheat  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Milling Wheat  31,841.93  31,537.36  31,369.96  31,709.50
Durum  Wheat  1,496.84  1,271.99  1,150.01  1,427.53 U.S.
Market  Price  ($/ton)
Feed  Wheat  110.23  110.52  110.68  114.45
Milling Wheat  134.68  134.77  134.82  135.46
Durum  Wheat  180.41  182.46  183.67  193.42
U.S.  Market  Prices  ($/bushel)
Average  Producer  Price  2.970  2.975  2.978  3.017
Deficiency  Payments  1.030  1.025  1.022  0.983
aDeficiency  Payments  0.000  -0.005  -0.008  -0.047
Government  Outlays  ($ million)
Deficiency Payments  1,932  1,922  1,916  1,845
aDeficiency  Payments  0.00  -9.94  -15.80  -87.28
Source:  Calculated by authors.  See Alston,  Gray,  and  Sumner (1994) for details.
Note:  "Combined  assumptions"  refers to a combination of a U.S. feed demand  elasticity
of -2.4, a U.S.  export demand  elasticity of -0.5, and  other assumption that mean  there
are  no third-country effects (see Alston,  Gray,  and  Sumner 1994 for details).
The USDA  stated  that they modeled a restriction  of wheat grain im-
ports  to  261,000  tonnes  (9.6  million  bushels)  without imposing  any  similar
restriction on imports of flour and other products, but assuming they would be
unaffected by a wheat import quota.  Essentially  this amounted in their analysis
to imposing  a total  quota of about  20 million bushels  on  wheat and products
imports from Canada (excluding pasta from the ROW).  This  means they (im-
plicitly)  simulated restricting total imports to 543,000 metric tonnes, 22.4 per-
cent of the base in  1993/94 rather than  50 percent.  The  USDA reported thatAiston, Gray and Sumner  151
such an import restriction would have resulted in an average U.S. price of wheat
about nine cents  per bushel higher and a deficiency payment cost about $230
million  lower.
To assess the USDA claims,  we  simulated  a  reduction  in imports  of
each type of wheat to 22.4 percent of the base.  The results of that simulation
are given in column C of Table  1. The 22.4 percent reduction in imports would
have  led  to a  saving  in  U.S. wheat deficiency  payments  of $15.8  million  in
1993/94-about  7  percent  of the savings  reported by the USDA.  We found it
difficult  to identify  even remotely  plausible combinations  of parameters  that
would yield effects nearly as large as those claimed by the USDA.
It appears that the USDA aggregated  all wheat types together, regard-
less of end-uses, treated pasta imports as unresponsive to trade barriers on grain
and other products, assumed quite small elasticities of supply and demand, and
ignored  "third-country"  effects  (see,  also,  Alston,  Carter,  Gray,  and  Sumner
1997). 7 In an attempt to replicate the figures of the USDA, in Alston, Gray, and
Sumner  (1994)  we estimated the effects of reducing  the U.S. imports  to 22.4
percent of the base given (i)  a U.S. feed demand elasticity of -2.4, (ii) an export
demand  elasticity of -0.5,  and (iii) precluding third-country effects.  The com-
bined effects  of changing  these  assumptions  is to increase  the estimated  in-
crease  in costs  of deficiency  payments to  $87.3 million  in  1993/94 (Table  1,
column D).  This is still only one-third of the value estimated by the USDA;  to
obtain  their estimate  would  require  use  of parameter  values  that  are totally
implausible.
The  ITC Staff Analysis
The ITC staff used a vector autoregression analysis of U.S. wheat prices
during the preceding  15 years, to estimate the price effects of changes in total
U.S. wheat supply.  Such a procedure ignores all of the structural features of the
7When  Canadian  wheat  is  withdrawn  from the  U.S. market,  it will  be diverted  onto
ROW  markets, depressing  prices  in the ROW  for Canadian  wheat and  its substitutes,
including  U.S.  wheat exported  to ROW  markets.  As  a consequence,  U.S. exports  to
ROW markets will contract  and U.S.  domestic prices will be lower, offsetting to some
extent the direct effect of the withdrawal of Canadian wheat.  Similar effects arise through
trade in pasta products.
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market-pasta  imports, product differences  and Canadian  export competition
with U.S.  wheat exported  to third markets.  Implicitly,  imports  from Canada
(or, for that matter, pasta imports from Italy) have exactly the same relationship
to the U.S. price of wheat as do changes  in the amount of idled land under set-
asides or a drought.  Further, the  1994 wheat market was assumed to be identi-
cal to that of 15  years previously,  when the European  Community was a cus-
tomer not a competitor, and when there were no U.S. export subsidy programs.8
The  ITC  staff  also  adapted  the  ITCs  general  simulation  model
(COMPAS)  to derive implied effects of imports on the domestic price of wheat.
This  model also left out pasta imports, and third-market  competition  between
the United  States and Canada-two features of the wheat trade that are funda-
mental  to understanding  the influence  of imports.
The  ITC  Reports-A Split Decision
The  ITC  forwarded  its findings  and recommendations-based  on  a
combination of information from the hearings  and internal analysis conducted
by the ITC staff--to the President on July  15,  1994.  Three  separate reports
were sent to the President,  each of which had distinct findings  and recommen-
dations.  Three  of the six commissioners (including  the Chair  and Vice Chair)
reported  as a group  that they determined  that there was no "material  interfer-
ence"  with the U.S. wheat program by imports.  Nonetheless, they provided the
President with recommended import restraints  should he have determined  (con-
trary to their findings)  that there were  grounds for restricting  imports.
A fourth commissioner,  determined  that there was sufficient  evidence
to determine  material interference,  but recommended  only a ten percent  addi-
tional duty be applied after imports reached 500,000 tons for durum and 800,000
tons for other wheat-i.e.,  after imports of all wheat and wheat flour exceeded
1.3 million metric  tons  in wheat  equivalent  units.  Such  a policy  would prob-
ably not have had any significant impact on imports. The last two commission-
ers also found material interference,  but they recommended  relatively tight tar-
iff-rate quotas,  or equivalent  tariffs, be  applied.
8Our concerns  about  such  an approach  were  outlined  in Alston,  Gray,  and  Sumner
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Negotiated  Resolution
Before the President took any action relative to the Section 22 case the
wheat  trade dispute between Canada  and the United  States came to a  negoti-
ated resolution at least for the  1994/95  year.  On August  1, 1994, the govern-
ment of Canada  agreed  to limit wheat exports  to the  United  States  and  the
United States agreed to drop  its efforts to restrict wheat imports. 9
Under  this agreement,  tariff rate quotas were used to restrict U.S. im-
ports of wheat from the CWB.  For durum wheat,  the very low NAFTA tariff
rate ($3/tonne) applied to the first 300,000 tonnes, a tariff of $23/tonne applied
to the  next  150,000  tonnes,  and a  rate of $50/tonne  applied  to imports  over
450,000 tonnes.  For "other" wheat  from the CWB,  the NAFTA tariff rate ap-
plied to the first  1,050,000 tonnes and a tariff of $50/tonne applied to imports
above that quantity.  The  $50/tonne  tariff was expected  to be prohibitive  for
both durum and "other"  wheat.  There  were no restrictions  on flour, semolina,
or Canadian soft red winter wheat from outside the Wheat Board area.
Although these restraints might have influenced the quantity of export
shipments during the twelve-month  period covered by the agreement,  it is in-
structive that the official USDA projections for total wheat imports during the
1994/95  marketing  year remained  at  80  million bushels  or  2.4 million  tons
(including  the grain equivalent  of flour and wheat  products) before  and  after
the  agreement.  The  agreement  was  not viewed,  even ex  ante,  as  a  binding
constraint on expected  U.S. imports by the USDA analysts,  except in the case
of durum. 1 0
9 At  the  same time,  the  two countries  agreed  to  appoint  a binational  panel  of non-
government experts, to examine and report on all aspects of Canadian and U.S. support
systems, and on competition between the two countries in third markets for wheat.  The
Canada-U.S.  Joint Commission  on  Grains filed its  final report in October  1995.  Al-
though  the report illuminated many of the differences  in the marketing  systems, little
concrete progress was made in addressing  the differences.
10As Figure  1 shows,  actual  imports in 1994/95  were only  12  million bushels  (about
330,300 tons) of durum and only 32 million bushels (870,000  tons) for other wheat.
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MORE  RECENT  EVENTS
The  policy  landscape  for grain  in the United  States  and Canada  has
changed substantially  since CUSTA and even since NAFTA was implemented
in January  1994.  CUSTA mandated  gradual tariff cuts and these have allowed
wheat  from Canada  to become  available  in the U.S.  market.  Other U.S.  and
Canadian  policy  changes  in  the  later  1990s  were not mandated  in CUSTA,
NAFTA or the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA).  It is argu-
able,  however,  that these changes  were,  in part, a  consequence  of these  trade
agreements.
U.S.  Policy Changes
The first change was the rapid reduction of the loan rate for wheat and
elimination of the price support  feature of the U.S. commodity  loan program.
These changes  meant that the government  no longer acquired stocks  of wheat
whenever the market price was low relative to some political norm.  They also
have  meant that the market price facing  buyers in the United States has been
allowed to decline to clear the market.  With an open border for wheat imports,
a substantially  higher  budget outlay  on  government  purchases  is required  to
maintain the government  set price.  The loan program remained, with low guar-
anteed  producer prices  implemented by direct payments  or loan repayment  at
the local market price,  which could be lower than the loan rate.
The second change was the replacement of annual deficiency payments
tied  to production,  with payments  tied only to a history  of wheat production,
and related  to  market  price  only  on  an  ad hoc  basis.  Because  they are  less
connected to production and market price, these payments  are less affected  by
imports.  The third change was the reduction and then elimination of required
acreage set-asides.  When imports may  freely enter, the price gain is  smaller
from a given amount of acreage idled, therefore the set-aside policy was gradu-
ally abandoned.
Finally, while EEP is still authorized,  the United States has not imple-
mented  its  export  price  subsidy  program for wheat  since  the middle  1990s.
Here,  again,  the effectiveness  of export subsidies  at raising domestic  prices is
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other reasons  for not using the export  enhancement  program  for wheat,  free
imports from Canada are  surely  a contributing  factor.
Wheat  Trade  Tensions
Since  the Section  22 hearings of 1994  there have been no  significant
grain  disputes  between Canada  and  the United  States.  No cases  have  been
brought to the NAFTA or WTO trade panels.  The only trade action of signifi-
cance was the U.S. introduction of an end-use certificate (EUC) for wheat im-
ported into the United States early in 1995.  This requirement had only a very
modest effect on trade flows and, according to Buckingham  and Gray (1996),
may have assisted the CWB in maintaining  monopoly control over  wheat ex-
ports.
Despite the lack of any tangible trade actions,  the anti-Canadian  grain
trade rhetoric has continued in the United States.  The U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, farm leaders,  and congressmen from wheat producing states have contin-
ued to publicly condemn  Canadian-U.S.  grain trade,  and in particular the ac-
tions  of the CWB.  U.S. wheat farm representatives  expressed their desire  to
address  the CWB issue within the next round of the WTO negotiations.
Canadian  Policies
Given continued access, market forces will continue to drive Canadian
grain exports to  the United  States.  The elimination  of the WGTA east-west
freight subsidy in 1995 made the United States an even more-attractive  market
for Canadian grain products (see Alston,  Carter,  Gray, and Sumner 1997).  As
Figure 1 shows, after a drop in 1995/96, imports  from Canada have been at or
above the 1993/94 quantities in each of the past three years.  And this occurred
without the stimulus from EEP export subsidies.
The operation of the CWB has been and remains a key trade irritant to
some U.S.  wheat interests.  However,  even  if the CWB  were  eliminated,  if
exports  to the United  States expanded,  we might reasonably  expect that U.S.
wheat producers would  continue  to mount  opposition to Canadian  wheat  ex-
ports and look for other rationalizations  for dispute.
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The U.S. industry is unlikely to obtain remedies for CWB behavior within
the existing NAFTA and the URAA. ] It seems unlikely that the CWB would find
it profitable  to price  discriminate  in  a way that  would be both  inimical  to U.S.
producer interests and in contravention of the anti-dumping  provisions that apply.
State trading  enterprises  are  allowed in  the GATT  and are  allowed to price dis-
criminate  as long  as they do so  within the bounds of commercial  practice.  Price
transparency  and the conduct of state trading  enterprises  will continue  to be dis-
cussed in the current round of WTO negotiations.  However,  given the number of
countries with STEs to protect,  it seems unlikely  that binding disciplines will be
forthcoming.  Therefore,  the decisions  concerning the CWB,  at least in the  short
run, lie with Canadian wheat and barley producers and the Canadian Government.
It also seems unlikely that the domestic pressure for reform will cause the govern-
ment of Canada to unilaterally remove the CWB any time soon.
PAST DISPUTES:  BASIC  CAUSES  AND  IMPLICATIONS  FOR
THE  FUTURE
We have  described  the wheat disputes between  the United States  and
Canada in the first half of the 1990s,  and the lack of formal disputes in the later
1990s.  Now we consider the fundamental reasons behind that pattern of events
and then go on to draw implications for future controversy  or formal disputes.
On one  level it  seems  clear that past  disputes were driven  by increased
imports of wheat into the United  States from Canada.  Before  the middle  1980s,
shipments South were quite small and  a tiny proportion  of the total  supply avail-
able in the U.S. market.  Imports then began to grow gradually,  with a notable jump
in the  1990/91 crop year.  A second large jump in 1992/93  brought import quanti-
ties to approximately  three times the 1989/90 figure, and another jump in  1993/94
left imports at four times the quantity that had seemed high just four years earlier.
During this period, wheat prices remained at low to moderate levels, with substan-
tial U.S. government payments used to make up the deficiency between the market
price and the government-set  target price (Figure 2).
" The Uruguay Round Agreement established the new World Trade Organization  (WTO)
which administers the General Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Negotiations
for the new  GATT/WTO Agreement  were concluded  in Marrakesh  on April  15,  1994
and the Agreement was implemented  in 1995.
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The pattern of imports and price after 1994 has not been conducive for
the  United States to take  trade actions  against Canada on wheat.  Serious  and
broad-based trade complaints  seem to require two market conditions.  First, a
high level of recent imports  compared to what market participants have  come
to accept as  normal.  Second,  a low commodity  price-again relative to some
accepted norm.  In the  early  1990s both of those requirements  held.  Compare
the period 1992/93-1993/94  for wheat to the period 1996/97-1997/98,  as shown
in Figure 2.  In the earlier period we had an increase  in imports of wheat coin-
ciding with  low prices.  In the later period we had a jump  in imports, but not
low  prices;  and by the  time wheat  prices  subsequently  dropped,  the  import
quantities had become a regular part of the market.  This made it hard to com-
plain that something  new was causing disruption.
To justify even the  1994 dispute  required a stretch of the imagination.
As documented  by Alston, Sumner,  and Gray (1994), a number of political and
meteorological  events contributed to the situation in 1994.  The political events
include the pledges made by President Clinton to build congressional support
for NAFTA and the process  leading up to the  signing of the URAA.  The me-
teorological  events include weather damage  to the U.S. and Canadian crops  in
1992/93 and 1993/94 that added to the volume of wheat trade, and the visibility
of that trade.  As the USDA/ERS (1999)  now notes in its most recent evaluation
of NAFTA:
Tariff reductions under  CFTA[CUSTA]/NAFTA  have increased
U.S.  wheat imports  from Canada  above what would have oc-
curred  without these agreements. However, sharp rises in U.S.
wheat imports, such as those that occurred  in 1994, have mainly
stemmed from weather-related  events.  (p.3).
In particular,  the combination of poor quality of the Canadian wheat crop with
weather-reduced  supply of U.S.  feed  grains,  encouraged  the flow of unprec-
edented  quantities  of wheat  used for livestock  feed.  This low-quality  wheat
competed  more  with corn,  sorghum  and barley  than with  other wheat  in the
United States.  Unfortunately,  the USDA was not willing to admit this point, at
least publicly,  in 1994.
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For trade actions to be pursued the government must have some poten-
tially plausible legal  basis for the action under current  law and in accordance
with current trade  agreements.  On these grounds,  too, the period  since  1994
has been less than conducive for trade actions.  As noted above, prior to imple-
mentation of the URAA,  the United  States reserved the right to block imports
whenever  they threatened  to materially interfere  with the operation of a U.S.
farm program.  This so-called Section 22 waiver was written into GATT rules
until  the United States  gave up that right for WTO members  in January  1995
when the implementation of the URAA took effect.  Ironically, even if the United
States had conclusively  won  the  1994 ITC case,  and if the President had  ap-
plied limits on imports of wheat from Canada under  Section 22, those restric-
tions  would  have  been  applicable  for at  most six months.  Furthermore,  the
U.S. deficiency  payment program,  which was  most at issue  in the  1994 case,
was eliminated in  1996 (Young and Westcott  1996).
The three main  remaining legal  bases for U.S.  trade action on  wheat
imports from Canada are (i)  special safeguard import barriers that may be used
in the case of import surges;  (ii)  countervailing  duties;  and (iii)  antidumping
duties.  Each of these requires demonstrated injury.  Special safeguards may be
applied  only  under limited  conditions,  in the  case  of large jumps  in  import
quantities.  Countervail and antidumping  duties require evidence of trade prac-
tices  that have  not been  shown  in prior wheat  cases. 1 2 A  fourth, extra-legal,
approach would be simply to apply quotas or other barriers- -accepting  that, in
accordance  with WTO rules, this would give Canada the right to demand com-
pensation.
CONCLUSION
The reduction in border measures following the introduction of CUSTA
resulted in  an increase in Canadian  bread wheat and durum wheat exports to
the United States. These increased trade flows resulted in four trade disputes.
In this paper we reviewed the Section 22 trade dispute in some detail.
In Sumner, Alston and Gray (1994), we reported detailed results of simulations
'2See USDA/ERS  (1999,  p.  21) for a review  of recent NAFTA disputes across  more
than a dozen commodities.
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using  a fully-documented model that suggested very small effects of Canadian
wheat  imports  on  U.S.  wheat prices  and on  U.S.  wheat program  costs.  The
USDA, however,  asserted that the effects were much more important,  claiming
that in  1993/94, for instance, an import quota on Canadian wheat grain equiva-
lent to 22.4 percent of the actual 1993/94 total would have reduced wheat farm
program costs by $230 million, compared with our estimate of $16 million for
that case.  A host of unreasonable  assumptions would be needed to replicate the
USDA projections of large  price impacts from relatively small changes in im-
ports. The  ITC staff conducted  a simplified analysis  that ignored most of the
structural  features  of the  wheat market.  This  approach led  them to  a  set  of
estimates that fell generally about midway between ours and those of the USDA.
The mixed  set of findings  and recommendations  from  the  USITC  may have
been  in part  due to the  mixed  signals  being given by  the agricultural  econo-
mists involved  in the issue.
Regardless of any perceived or actual imperfections in the dispute settle-
ment processes, wheat continues to flow from Canada to the United States with
little  restriction.  There  have  been no legal challenges  for the past five  years,
despite wheat trade at record levels and low farm prices (Figure 2). Perhaps the
largest beneficial  effect of CUSTA, NAFTA  and URAA  has been the implicit
discipline  placed  on export  subsides  in both countries.  Any U.S.  use of the
EEP program  would  encourage  exports  to the U.S.  markets.  Similarly,  any
attempt by the CWB to use higher domestic prices to subsidize exports  would
be constrained by competition in Canada from imports from the United States.
Two  features  of government  policy  might cause  continuing  conflict.
The  export  monopoly  of the CWB  continues  to  be  an issue, particularly  in
terms  of transparency.  When  U.S.  farmers  look North,  they cannot  help but
suspect some trade effect of the CWB.  However,  there is growing awareness
that the removal  of the CWB's monopoly  position might increase  rather than
reduce  flows to the U.S. market.  The issue is likely to remain unresolved  un-
less Canada decides  to remove  these powers from the CWB.
The  other possible source  of conflict,  is  the recent  disparity between
the agricultural  budget transfers offered by the United States as compared with
Canada.  When Canadian  farmers look South,  they cannot help  but envy pay-
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ments made to farmers or former farmers under various U.S. government pro-
grams.  This is true  even if measured  or projected trade effects  of these pay-
ment programs  are at most small (Young and Westcott 2000).
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